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Abstract 
Inspired by the empirical work of Holmes (2011), which suggests the economic importance of 
distribution costs in the firm's optimal location decision, this paper introduces endogenous 
distribution costs in the model of Hotelling (1929). The proposed model shows an interesting 
trade-off between demand and cost considerations when a firm plays a hybrid location 
strategy. Given the location of local distribution centers and agents' displacement cost 
parameters, it is shown that, under certain conditions, the optimal location of the firms are in 
the interior of the Hotelling line rather than at the edges of the line. The supply cost effect 
which drives this result diminishes with the distance of the distribution center from the market 
so that the scale of the distribution area becomes also determinant for an optimal location 
strategy. The theoretical results are complemented with an empirical analysis for distribution 
intensive grocery retailers using location data for the two main conventional supermarket 
chains in the U.S. The data suggest that the firms consider distribution costs when 
differentiating from the competitor. 
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1 Introduction
For distribution intensive industries with strong cost focus and high turnover rate of mer-
chandise, business concepts suggest that the optimization of logistic costs plays a crucial
role to be competitive (Andersen and Poulfelt, 2006). However, most of the economic
models either do not account at all for distribution costs or include them (implicitly) as
exogenous fixed costs. Such a setting is in general unproblematic for market entry mod-
els but may be problematic in the context of optimal geographic differentiation between
competing firms. A certain location decision considering demand and competition effect
may be optimal for given fixed costs but once we consider supply costs, as part of the
fixed costs depending on the actual location of the firm and it’s distribution center, it
might be profitable to locate closer to the distribution facility to decrease supply costs
although this may imply less differentiation to competitors. Inspired by the empirical
work of Holmes (2011) which suggests the economic importance of distribution costs in
the optimal location decision of a firm (Wal-Mart), this paper introduces endogenous dis-
tribution costs in the duopoly model of Hotelling (1929).
Such an environment causes a tension between demand and supply strategy of location
choice which to the best of my knowledge has neither been analyzed in a theoretical model
of product differentiation nor is there any empirical analysis for oligopoly industries.
Considering the theoretical literature, the work-horse of spatial location choice is Hotelling’s
linear city model (1929) and the subsequent work by d’Aspremont et al. (1979). This
model of price competition allows to analyze product differentiation in a simple framework
and has given rise to numerous extensions. For a review see Anderson et al. (1992) or
Tirole (1998). Recent examples are Meagher et al. (2008) analyzing the equilibrium ex-
istence under different consumer distributions or Hamoudi and Moral (2005) considering
linear-quadratic transportation costs for consumers. But while the demand side has been
extensively analyzed, to the costs of the firms, in particular product specific fixed costs,
has not been paid much attention. The theoretical literature is complemented by em-
pirical and computational papers. For given supermarket locations, Matsa (2011) shows
that the distance to the distribution centers has a negative effect on the store’s product
availability. Considering endogenous location choice, the seminal work by Mazzeo (2002)
and Seim (2006) provide empirical evidence for the market power effect of product differ-
entiation within a market but cost strategies that may alter the optimal location decision
remain unconsidered. The first empirical analysis incorporating supply aspects in an en-
dogenous location choice model is Holmes (2011). He uses a computational analysis to
show in a dynamic market entry model that the optimal location strategy of Walmart
is based on a trade-off between proximity of stores to distribution centers and own store
demand cannibalization. His work has inspired other researchers to incorporate supply
distances in empirical models of entry or location choice (e.g. Ellickson, 2010; Zhu and
Singh, 2009; Vitorino, 2012).
This paper proposes a price-location game in which firms use hybrid location strategies
considering cost-efficiency and horizontal competition simultaneously. On the demand
side consumers incur in travel costs to buy at a certain store. On the supply side, each
firm’s store is day-to-day stocked up by an (own) exogenous distribution center, which
can be located in or outside the linear market, and firms have to bear the supply costs.
Consumers face quadratic travel costs while firms’ displacement costs are modeled as a
linear-quadratic function of the supply distance to allow for a more flexible shape, since
contrary to consumers, suppliers are allowed to ’travel’ to firms from outside the market.
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Solving for the optimal location choice, shows an interesting trade-off between returns to
product differentiation and distribution economies. It is shown that under certain con-
ditions, depending on the location of the distribution centers and agents’ displacement
cost parameters, the optimal location of the firms are in the interior of the Hotelling line
rather than at the edges of the market (maximal differentiation). The supply cost effect,
which drives this result through the compensation of lower revenues with lower distri-
bution costs, diminishes with the distance of the distribution center from the market so
that the scale of the distribution area becomes crucial for an optimal location strategy.
Finally, in the presence of distribution costs, firms are better off in terms of net profits
when applying a hybrid location strategy rather than a pure demand based location strat-
egy. Considering the welfare implications of the dual location choice, it is shown that the
incentive to generate market power through differentiation still leads to excessive differ-
entiation, but less than in the standard model if the supply cost parameter is sufficiently
high relative to the consumers’ transportation cost parameter.
The theoretical results are complemented with an empirical analysis for distribution in-
tensive grocery retailers using location data on the stores and distribution centers of
Kroger Co. and Safeway Inc., the two main conventional supermarket chains in the U.S.,
which are processed using the Geographic Information System ArcGIS. I find that the
two chains target similar markets and include distribution cost considerations in their
location choice with respect to the competitor. In particular, for the location of Kroger
stores, I find a U-shaped pattern between the distribution distance and the differentiation
to the competitor that is in line with the proposed theoretical model.
The next section presents the model and section 3 provides the empirical application.
In this paper, I refer to differentiation as a geographic element, but the presented mech-
anism can be generalized to further applications which are briefly outlined in section
4.
2 The Linear City with Distribution Costs
2.1 The model
The model setting is based on Hotelling’s linear city model (1929) with quadratic trans-
portation costs (d’Aspremont et al.,1979), which yields a well defined equilibrium of max-
imal product differentiation.1 In this common setup I introduce endogenous distribution
costs which are carried by the firms as part of their fixed costs.
There are two firms, firm A and firm B, selling both homogeneous grocery baskets and
competing in locations and prices. The fresh merchandises are delivered every day from
a (firm own) regional distribution center (DC). A continuum of consumers is uniformly
distributed over a linear market of length r, X ∼ U [0, r] and each consumer buys just one
grocery basket.2 Additional to the standard model, both types of agents, consumers and
firms, face displacement costs which changes significantly the equilibrium location strat-
egy. On the demand side consumers incur in travel costs to buy at a certain store. On
the supply side, each firm’s store is day-to-day stocked up by an exogenous distribution
1This is not any more true if we allow for consumer heterogeneity other than just in their locations
(Anderson et al., 1992).
2All consumers are assumed to buy so that the market is fully served.
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center, which can be located in or outside the linear market, and firms have to bear the
supply costs.3 The location of the DC in space is characterized as (za1 , z
a
2) and (z
b
1, z
b
2)
respectively. We use a reference coordinate system where the linear market builds the
horizontal-axis and the left end of the market is defined as the origin of the coordinate
system.4 Hence, the shortest distance from the DC to the market can directly be indi-
cated as |zj2| and the orthogonal projection of a DC onto the market is just (zj1, 0), with
j = {a, b}. Figure 1 illustrates exemplarily two possible situations where both firms are
supplied by a common DC. While in Figure (a) the firms are supplied by a DC which is
situated in the linear market (z2 = 0), Figure (b) illustrates a situation where firms are
stocked up by a DC located outside the market. In the following I refer to this two cases
as Market-DC and Non-Market-DC respectively.
Figure 1: The Linear City with Distribution Costs
(a) Market-DC (b) Non-Market-DC
Considering the consumer side, consumer i who lives at xi faces quadratic travel costs
TCi(a) = t · (a − xi)2 if he buys from A and TCi(b) = t · (r − b − xi)2 if he buys from
B, where t is the travel cost parameter and a and r − b the respective firm locations.
Firms’ displacement costs are specified in a similar way. Distribution costs are modeled
as linear-quadratic functions of the supply distance which can be reduced to a quadratic
function for the simple case where the DC is located inside the market. We choose this
cost specification to allow for a more flexible shape, since contrary to consumers, suppliers
are allowed to ’travel’ to firms from outside the market. The distribution distance can
be simply expressed as the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle between the DC and
the store location. Hence, given the location of firm A’s DC or exogenous supplier, the
3The exogeneity assumption of the DCs is easy to justify whenever the DCs belong to a third party
or a firm leases already existing DCs of another chain (Recent example: Target entering the Canadian
market). If the DCs are firm own, the DC-location may be considered as an endogenous decision of the
firm. In this paper we abstract from this special case, focusing on firms that use ex-ante established
facilities or third party service providers.
4A similar framework of firms choosing their locations on a line while the environment is allowed to
be two-dimensional is used by Thomadsen(2006). He places two heterogeneous fast food stores on a line
and let them choose their optimal locations in terms of the distance from the center while consumers are
distributed over a two-dimensional space.
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distribution costs for store A are given by
DCa(a; z
a) = d1 · (Supply Distance)2 + d2 · (Supply Distance)
= d1 ·
[
(a− za1)2 + (za2)2
]
+ d2 ·
√
(za1 − a)2 + (za2)2
where d1 and d2 are distribution cost parameters capturing the linear-quadratic shape of
the supply cost function. To reduce the analysis to a non-negative, increasing and convex
supply cost function, I assume d1 ≥ 0, d2 ≥ 0.5 The specification includes the case of
quadratic costs (d2 = 0) which is illustrated in Figure 2. It is immediately clear that the
distribution costs increase with the distance of the distribution center from the market.
But notice that the distribution cost effect of moving one unit closer to the projected
distribution facility (z1) increases the closer the supplier is to the market (smaller z2).
Figure 2: Distribution costs
d1 > 0, d2 = 0
With this in mind, the firms’ strategic decisions take place in two stages. First, firm A
and B decide simultaneously their store locations a and r− b respectively. The feasibility
constraint of the location choice, which is indicated in terms of the distance from the
market edges, implies that a, b ∈ [0, r]. Additionally, I assume that a ≤ b. Once the
two grocery firms are established they compete in prices. The firms set prices pa and
pb depending on the degree of differentiation and hence the strength of competition in
the market. Based on each firm’s location and the prices offered, the utility maximizing
consumers face a discrete choice problem at which store to buy.
5The linear-quadratic cost specification in the Hotelling model is not new. Hamoudi and Moral (2005)
for example use a linear-quadratic cost specification for consumers’ travel costs to allow for concave
transportation costs. We use a similar specification for the supply costs but impose the restriction
of a convex cost structure. Instead of assuming d1 ≥ 0, the assumption could be relaxed allowing
for a non-monotonic shape of the cost function. In this case, in order to guarantee a non-negative
cost function, I may extend the cost specification to a general second degree polynomial DCa(a; z
a) =
d0 + d2 · SDistance + d1 · (SDistance)2 with at most one root. The additional term d0 ≥ 0 could be
interpreted as fixed operation costs.
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2.2 Equilibrium locations
Given the environment presented in the previous section, the game is solved recursively.
Compared with the standard linear city model, the pricing stage doesn’t change and
hence I abstain from a detailed discussion of this stage.6 The indifferent consumer is
given by x˜ = pb−pa
2t(r−b−a) +
r−b+a
2
, the store-demand is Da = x˜ and Db = r − x˜ respectively
so that the resulting optimal prices given any two store locations (a, r − b) are p∗a(a, b) =
c+t·(r−a−b)r+1/3·t·(r−a−b)(a−b) and p∗b(a, b) = c+t·(r−a−b)r−1/3·t·(r−a−b)(a−b).
Given the optimal pricing decision and the exogenous locations of the DCs, firm A chooses
it’s optimal location solving the following problem:{
Maxa[p
∗
a(a, b)− c]Da (p∗a(a, b))−DCa (a; za1 , za2)
s.t. a ∈ [0, r]
}
Note that the firm’s location choice enters not only in the demand, but as well in the cost
function. Solving for a, under the first order condition of the pricing stage, yields the
following optimality condition for the firm’s location choice:
FOCa : (pa − c)
[
∂Da
∂a
+
∂Da
∂pb
∂pb
∂a
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
MRPD
≤ ∂DCa
∂a︸ ︷︷ ︸
MRDE
(1)
The inequality condition (1) clearly indicates the trade-off between marginal returns on
product differentiation (MRPD), which reflects the competition effect, and marginal re-
turns in form of distribution economies (MRDE). It captures the dual nature of location
choice and it’s effect on firm’s profit. In other words, assuming a < za1 , if firm A moves
marginally away from the extreme towards firm B, competition increases and revenues
decrease but at the same time the firm moves closer to the distribution center, such that
the firm saves on logistic costs.7 If the savings on supply costs are bigger than the loss
of revenues, it is optimal for the firm to move towards the competing firm at the cost of
stronger price competition.
Figure 3 illustrates this trade-off. The profit is maximized where MRPD equals MRDE.
The optimal location choice depends on the one hand on firm B’s location choice and
consumers’ travel cost parameter which shift the MRPD and on the other hand on the
firm’s distribution cost parameters as well as the location of the DC which alter the degree
of convexity of the MRDE.8 However, the inequality in the best response condition (1)
indicates that there may be situations where firm B’s location and the set of displacement
parameters is such that firm A chooses a corner solution locating at the market edge
a = 0. Proposition 1 provides conditions which guarantee a best location response inside
the market where MRPD equals MRDE with a view to the symmetric location choice.
6This is due to the setting analog Holmes (2011), defining the distribution costs as fixed costs inde-
pendent of the sales volume. (In an extension we may additionally allow the unit variable costs to be an
increasing function of the distribution distance, so that the DC location determines directly the optimal
pricing decision.)
7Note that a > za1 can never be an optimal location for the firm, since a marginal decrease in a implies
a reduction in distribution costs as well as an increase in market power.
8Exemplarily in Figure 3 I set b = 0, 3 and the set of displacement parameters (t = d1 = d2 = 1) with
a DC at (za1 , z
a
2 ) = (0, 5; 0, 1).
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Figure 3: Best Location Response
Proposition 1. The firm’s best location is an interior solution on the Hotelling Line
if the consumers’ travel cost parameter is small enough (relative to the distribution cost
parameter).
In other words, a threshold value tcrit determines when the supply side consideration
becomes relevant for the firm’s location choice (see Appendix). Let’s focus in the following
on the interesting case where t < tcrit.
The effect of the location of the DC on the firm’s optimal location response can be broken
down into a local-effect and a scale-effect.
∂DCa
∂a
= −
2d1 · (za1 − a) + d2︸ ︷︷ ︸
local−effect
· (z
a
1 − a)√
(za1 − a)2 + (za2)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
scale−effect

The local-effect is the MRDE if the DC were located at the orthogonal projection of the
DC on the linear market (za1 , 0). This hypothetical location is used to identify the impact
of the size of the distribution area which I denote as the scale-effect. The scale-effect is
the part of the MRDE which is determined by the distance of the DC to the market. The
latter is especially relevant if we think of logistic centers being located in industrial areas
outside the town.9
Proposition 2. The Supply-cost-effect on the optimal location response diminishes with
the distance of the DC from the Market.
The more far away the DC is with respect to the market (shopping area), the smaller is
the scale-effect and hence the absolute value of the MRDE. This implies that the supply
effect on the firm’s optimal location choice is most relevant if the distribution center is not
too far from the market. The importance of this result lies in the dependence of the firm’s
strategic location choice on the scale of its distribution area. Notice that the MRDE is
zero when A settles down at the projected location of the DC, i.e. at a = za1 . However, this
would only be an optimal location if we consider only the supply side ignoring the demand
side incentive of product differentiation to create market power. In the following, I solve
for the equilibrium considering both, supply and demand side implications of location
9An alternative argument are firms operating in several markets and being supplied by only one DC
(not captured in the model).
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choice. Considering firm A and B simultaneously yields a system of best responses. To
solve for the optimal location choice, as mentioned before, I distinguish between the
situation where the DC(s) are located inside the market and a more general situation
allowing the DC(s) to be located outside the market.
2.2.1 Distribution center(s) inside the market
It is helpful to first consider the case in which the DC(s) are located somewhere on the
Hotelling line. We refer to this as Market-DCs, since the distribution centers are located
inside the market such that za2 = z
b
2 = 0. From the optimal location condition as outlined
in equation (1) we get a best-response-system BRa(b), BRb(a) which yields the following
polynomial system:
a2
(−1
6
t
)
+a
(−1
2
t− 1
18
tr − 2d1
)
+b
(−1
6
t+ 1
18
tr
)
+b2
(
1
18
t
)
+ab
(
1
9
)
+
(
2d1z
a
1 + d2 − 16tr
)
= 0
b2
(−1
6
t
)
+ b
(−1
2
t− 1
18
tr − 2d1
)
+ a
(−1
6
t+ 1
18
tr
)
+ a2
(
1
18
t
)
+ ab
(
1
9
)
+(
2d1(r − zb1) + d2 − 16tr
)
= 0
We can see from the polynomial structure that under DC-symmetry, that is if za1 = r−zb1,
which includes the case of a co-located or joint DC at z1 =
1
r
, we will have a symmetric
location solution.10 In the following I focus on the symmetric location equilibrium.11
Solving for the optimal location choice yields the following symmetric and unique Nash-
equilibrium:
a∗(z, t, d) = b∗(z, t, d) =
{
0 if t ≥ tcrit(d, z),
(12d1z
a
1 + 6d2 − tr) / (4t+ 12d1) if t < tcrit(d, z),
(2)
The optimal location choice is characterized by the location of the DCs, captured in the
vector z, as well as the displacement cost parameters t and d = (d1, d2). Analog Proposi-
tion 1, we can express the threshold of an interior solution as a critical value of consumers’
transportation costs tcrit (or as function of the relative importance of transportation and
distribution costs captured in γ = t/d1 which requires γ < γcrit =
12za1+6
r
).12 To sum-
marize, for the union of the set of supply side parameters and the set of demand side
parameters ΘS ∪ΘS, with
ΘS = {(za1 , d1, d2) : za1 ∈ [0, r]; d1, d2 ∈ <+; za1 > (tr − 6d1)/(12d1)} and
ΘD =
{
(t, r) : t, r ∈ <+; t < d1
r
(12za1 + 6)
}
,
exists a unique optimal location choice in the interior of the Hotelling line. This result
implies that when allowing for the coexistence of demand and cost strategies we can
establish interior locations on the product space (contrary to the maximal product differ-
entiation in the standard model which analyzes optimal product location only from the
10The analytical derivation is provided in the Appendix.
11Looking at real retail store locations, which I analyze in Part II, I find that in markets with a strong
distribution cost advantage only one chain is active while in markets where the two main supermarket
chains are competing the DCs are in general co-located or very close to each other such that the symmetry
assumption of the distribution costs is not too strong.
12Alternatively, we could express the existence of an interior equilibrium as a function of a critical
za1 (t, d).
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demand side perspective). It is easy to show that if the DC is sufficiently far from the
market edges and t < tcrit, the optimal location choice of the firm exists and is a unique
interior point of the Hotelling line which solves the trade-off between MRPD and MRDE.
A special case of an interior solution is the situation where a = za1 minimizes distribution
costs.
The result is consistent with standard models. If t = 0, such that there is no incentive to
differentiate geographically, firms settle down at the location of their distribution centers
to minimize costs (za1 = z
b
1 = r/2 implies Bertrand’s equilibrium). The other extreme are
pretty high transportation costs for consumers. If the travel cost parameter t exceeds the
critical threshold, which happens if t is much higher than the distribution cost parameter
d1, the demand strategy becomes dominant and firms choose maximal differentiation. Fi-
nally, if d1 = d2 = 0, the optimal location is again the one of the d’Aspremont case. Hence,
the presence of firms’ distribution costs can decrease the degree of product differentiation
which enhances price competition.
2.2.2 Generalization of the DC location(s)
Let us now consider the more general case where firms are supplied from distribution
centers which are allowed to be located outside the market. We now distinguish between
Market-DCs and Non-Market-DCs, where the latter refers to DCs which are located
off the Hotelling line. Given the location of the exogenous DC(s) and the displacement
parameters of consumers and firms, Firm A’s implicit best response on B’s location choice
becomes the following:
a2
(−1
6
t
)
+ a
(−1
2
t− 1
18
tr
)
+ b
(−1
6
t+ 1
18
tr
)
+ b2
(
1
18
t
)
+ ab
(
1
9
)
+
(−1
6
tr
) ≤
−2d1 (za1 − a)− d2 (z
a
1−a)√
(za1−a)2+(za2 )2
Firm B faces an analog trade-off. Note that whenever z2 6= 0 (Non-Market-DC), the
MRDE are not any more linear in a. This is due to the diminishing supply-cost-effect as
stated in Theorem 2. This implies that the chosen cost specification of the distribution
costs is intuitive but comes at a cost, that the model is no longer analytically solvable.
However, focusing on the symmetric case of location choice, i.e. za1 = r − zb1 and za2 =
zb2 = z2 ∈ <, the solution can be plotted for any set of displacement parameters (t, d).
Figure 4a illustrates the dependence of the location choice a on the location of it’s DC
at (za1 , z
a
2). Since I focus on the symmetric case, the graph depicts only the market side
for firm A (mirrored for firm B). It is easy to verify that, analog the previous section, the
further away the DC projection (za1 , 0) is from the market edge, the larger is also a. But,
considering the transverse section of the graph, depicted in Figure 4b, note that the effect
diminishes in |z2|, that is with the distance from the market.
Analog the case of Market-DC(s), the set of parameters for which an interior solution
exists for the general case is defined as follows:
Θ∗ =
{
(z, d, t, r) : za1 ∈ [0, r]; d1, d2 ∈ <+; t, r ∈ <+; d2z
a
2√
(za1 )
2+(za2 )
2
+ 2d1z
a
1 ≤ 16tr
}
.
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Figure 4: Market-DC and Non-Market-DC
(a) a(z1, z2) (b) a(z2|z1 = 0.5)
Although I can’t solve for the general case analytically, the graphical illustration on the
one hand confirms the results from the previous section and on the other hand exposes
the impact of the size of the distribution area in the location consideration. That is, once
firms consider distribution costs in their location decision, it may not be optimal anymore
to employ maximal differentiation but the distribution economies which drive this result
diminish when the distance from the DC to the market becomes large. In other words, the
closer the DC is to the market, the stronger is the trade-off between returns to product
differentiation and returns in form of distribution economies.
2.3 Welfare implications
To push the analysis further, I consider the welfare implications when accounting for
distribution costs in the optimal location strategy. Maximizing social welfare in the
Hotelling framework is equivalent to minimizing costs. However in the presented model
there are two types of costs. While consumers’ transportation costs are minimized at
aTC = bTC = r
4
, distribution costs are minimized at the projected DC location, that is
at aDC = bDC = za1 = r − zb1. It is easy to deduce that in the interval [ r4 , za1 ] the social
planner will face a trade-off between increasing total transportation costs and decreasing
distribution costs, or inversely if za1 <
r
4
. In the following I solve for the social optimum
for the case where the DC is located in the market to make it comparable to the closed
form solution provided in section 2.2.1. The planner faces the following problem:
Min {T (a, b) +D(a, b)}(a,b)
where T (a, b) are the total transportation costs payed by the consumers, that is T (a, b) =∫ x˜
0
t(a−x)2f(x)dx+∫ r
x˜
t(r−b−x)2f(x)dx, andD(a, b) are the total distribution costs payed
by the firms so thatD(a, b|z2 = 0) = d1·
[
(za1 − a)2 + (r − b− zb1)2
]
+d2·
[
(za1 − a) + (r − b− zb1)
]
.
Solving for the optimal locations yields the following first order condition for a:
∂T (a,b)
∂a
+ ∂D(a,b)
∂a
= t ·
(
a2 − ( r−b−a
2
)2)− d1 · (2za1 − 2a)− d2
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and analog for b with r − zb1 = za1 . Solving for the social optimum, under the coexistence
of positive travel costs and positive supply costs, the system yields after rearrangement
the following social optimal locations:
asocialH&H(z, t, d > 0) =
0.25tr2 + 2z1d1 + d2
2d1 + tr
and bsocialH&H = r − asocialH&H (3)
Note that while in the standard Hotelling framework without distribution costs the social
optimum is independent of the consumers’ transportation cost parameter (t > 0), in my
model which internalizes distribution cost effects, the social optimum depends on the
displacement parameters of consumers and firms.
Figure 5: Optimal market location and social optimum (for firm A).
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a*(standard)
aS(standard)
θS = (z1 = 0.5, z2 = 0, d1 = 1, d2 = 0).
Moreover note that lim(d1,d2)→0a
social
H&H =
r
4
which is consistent with the standard Hotelling
setting. On the other hand limt→0asocialH&H = z1 +
d2
d1
which minimizes distribution costs.
Setting d2 = 0, which imposes quadratic distribution costs but is no problem whenever the
DC is located inside the market as in the present case, the optimal location is just next to
the DC. Finally, comparing the social optimum with the market outcome I find that the
market forces still lead to excessive differentiation, that is a gap between market outcome
and social optimum, but less than in the standard model if the supply cost parameter
is sufficiently high relative to the consumers’ transportation cost parameter. We briefly
illustrate the excessive differentiation (∆D) as a function of the relative importance of
distribution costs and transportation costs defining γ ≡ t/d1 with t > 0, d1 > 0. I choose
this representation since it reflects the relative importance of the competition effect which
is the source of the inefficiency. Since this section considers the case of Market-DCs,
without loss of generality I set d2 = 0 and r = 1 such that the differentiation-gap is given
by
∆D(γ, za1) = a
S
H&H − a∗H&H =
2γ2 + (5− 4z1)γ
4γ2 + 20γ + 24
∈
{
[0, 1
4
] if γ ≤ γ¯(za1),
[1
4
, 1
2
] if γ > γ¯(za1),
(4)
Consequently, for γ ≤ γ¯(za1), where γ¯(za1) = 2za1 +
√
(2za1)
2 + 6, the gap between so-
cial optimal differentiation and the market outcome is smaller than in the standard
model. Figure 5 illustrated this result and provides at the same time a comparison
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of the market outcome (solid lines) and social optimum (dashed line) for the ’Hotelling
meets Holmes’(H&H)-model and the standard Hotelling model as a function of consumers’
transportation costs. Given any distribution cost setting θS, the graph shows that the
discrepancy between optimal market location and social optimum increases in t for inte-
rior solutions and decreases if t ≥ tcrit, where the firm chooses a corner solution. In the
limit (t → ∞) the supply effect is dominated by the competition effect and we are back
to the standard model.
3 An application to the location of supermarkets
In this section I aim to verify the impact of distribution costs on firms geographic dif-
ferentiation empirically for a particular example of a distribution intensive industry. I
consider the leading conventional supermarket chains in the US, namely The Kroger Co.
followed by Safeway Inc., both market-listed and operating predominantly ’neighborhood
grocery stores’. With focus on the trade-off between differentiation from competitors and
distribution economies, I have chosen competitors which are on a par with each other
and abstract from the competitive pressure of mass merchandisers like Walmart on tradi-
tional supermarkets (see for example Jia, 2008, or Matsa, 2011).13 I also abstract from a
possible trade-off between differentiation and agglomeration which is considered by Datta
and Sudhir (2011). I present first the data and the measure of differentiation and sub-
sequently use a multivariate regression analysis to verify if the presented model offers a
valid explanation for the firm behaviour revealed through the observed location choice.
3.1 Data
I use data on supermarket locations in the U.S. for Kroger and Safeway. All the store
locations have been identified from POI datasets.14 The advantage of this type of data
source is that locations are already geocodificated which avoids matching problems in a
manual geocodification (which would be necessary to measure efficiently the geographic
differentiation between a huge number of stores). Additional information from the respec-
tive firm’s website allow to identify the store format which is operated under a certain
banner and the location of the regional distribution centers. Moreover stakeholder infor-
mation, especially the ’Fact Book’ and ’Annual Report’, allow to verify the consistency
of the POI data which turns out to be highly accurate. The differences in the number
of stores indicated by the POI dataset and the official financial publications are 3 stores
for Kroger and 24 stores for Safeway. Both small deviations with respect to the total
number of stores of the chains. The difference is assigned to the time difference in the
data collection for the POI dataset and the corporate financial information. More detailed
comments on the data are provided in the appendix.
13Originally I considered also the bix box chains Walmart and Target but contrary to the neighborhood
stores of Kroger and Safeway, I find that these chains are not operating in the same geographic markets
or the markets would have to be defined extremely large such that assuming consumer to travel in such
a large geographic area to purchase fresh grocery products becomes implausible in terms of irrational
travel distances. The data indicate that only 67% of Walmart’s stores are located in urban areas, while
Target operates 81% of it’s stores in urban regions.
14POI stands for ’Point of Interest’, an expression from the GPS technology where this datasets are
used to provide GPS customers of any brand with an update of locations which might be of their interest
when on the road. Some common examples of POIs other than supermarkets are hospitals, speed cameras
or gas stations.
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For the spatial analysis, in particular the calculation of geographic distances, I use the
Geographic Information System ArcGIS. Based on free available polygon shape files for
different spatial units in the U.S. with associated demographic characteristics, I define
reasonable geographic markets and construct the following cross-section datasets:
Markets =
{
Popm, HHm, SQMIm, N
K
m , N
S
m, Dist centroid
DC,j
m
}
Stores =
{
Xs, Ys, Diff
comp
s ;Popmsj, HHmsj, SQMImsj, N
own
m , N
comp
m , Dist
DC,own
ms
}
The first dataset type consists of market level data. The observations are the markets,
indexed by ’m’, where at least one supermarket chain is active and associated variables
like the number of stores per chain in each market (NKm for Kroger and N
S
m for Safeway
respectively), the population and number of households per market (Popm, HHm), the
geographic market size in square miles (SQMIm) and the distance from the market cen-
troid to the closest regional distribution center of each firm (Dist centroidDC,jm ).
The second dataset consists of store level data and associated market data for a particular
store s. The store data have been constructed using a vertical combination of the store
dataset for each firm. The final dataset contains the projected store locations (Xs, Ys),
the distance from the store to the closest regional DC of the respective chain affiliation
(DistDC,ownms ) and the distance to the closest competitor store within a market (Diff
comp
s ).
The associated market features are as in the market level data.
3.2 Descriptive Proximity Analysis
In total Kroger counts 2.110 and Safeway 1.487 supermarket stores. Since I am interested
in firms’ location choice inside a market, I need to define reasonable shopping areas to iden-
tify where stores compete. In the literature based on Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) markets
are usually defined as isolated cities. Recently Ellickson et al.(2011) proposed a variation
where this assumption is relaxed allowing for market spillover effects for metropolitan and
micropolitan areas but I find that this market definition is too large to be considered a
shopping area for fresh grocery products. Instead I was looking for a market area defini-
tion such that consumers can be assumed to move in this area for grocery shopping given
the data availability constraints of demographic and geographic market characteristics.15
I propose ’Urban Areas’ (UAs), densely settled census block groups that meet a mini-
mum population density, as natural shopping areas for neighborhood supermarkets. To
the best of my knowledge this definition has not been used so far in this context but the
statistics show that this market definition captures almost all supermarkets in the data
and yields reasonable travel dimensions for grocery products. I find that approximately
90 % of all neighborhood stores of the two considered chains are located in UAs which is
taken as evidence for a natural shopping area for this type of stores. To illustrate where
this markets are located, the appendix provides a map of the considered markets. Figure
6 provides a summary of the variables that will be used in the following analysis.
Considering the ’Contiguous U.S.’, that is the United States excluding Alaska and Hawaii,
Kroger, as the leading supermarket chain, operates in more markets than Safeway and
15This is in line with the geographic market definition by the European Commission which defines
a retail market for daily consumer goods as ”the boundaries of a territory where the outlets can be
reached easily by consumers (radius of approximately 20 to 30 minutes driving time)” (COMP/M.5112
REWE/PLUS par.18, 2008).
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Figure 6: Summary Statistics
Figure 7: Distance Distributions
(a) Differentiation (b) Supply-Distance
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counts more DCs, which is not surprising since being active in a larger geographical space,
it’s markets are organized in more distribution areas. However, the statistics show that
the two main supermarket chains target similar markets. The data even suggest that
their strategic entry decision is statistical equal in markets where they compete with each
other (which I indicate in the statistics with the condition ’Competition’).16
Section two of the summary statistics indicates proximity measures, that is the distances
between stores of the same chain, to competitors and to the closest distribution center
which supplies a certain chain. All the distances are measured in Euclidean distances
in miles. Comparing the two main supermarket chains, an average distance of 2,82 or
2,68 miles respectively to own stores indicates similar pattern. Taking into account that
Kroger indicates that it’s supermarkets draw on average customers from 2,0-2,5 mile ra-
dius (’2011 Kroger Fact Book’), the average own-store-differentiation in the data suggests
the existence of overlapping market areas. We will see if the supply consideration in the
location choice partially explains this observations.17 The average differentiation between
competing chain stores in the same market is with 1,96 miles smaller than the differen-
tiation to own stores. Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of the distance variables with
more detail. We provide kernel density plots for the distance measures. Note that the
own-store differentiation of both supermarket chains follow a very similar pattern. The
same holds for the differentiation to the competitor in the markets where both chains
are active but with a shift to the left which reflects the lower expected differentiation
compared to own stores. Considering the distribution of the supply distance, both firms
show a mode around 30 miles, from 80 miles until 100 miles and 120 miles respectively the
distribution becomes almost flat and subsequently decreases. It reflects the colonization
pattern of stores close to DCs while the flat region may suggest a kind of indifference belt
followed by a possible distance threshold.
3.3 Empirical Analysis of Supply Distance Effects
In order to verify, whether the proposed mechanism suggested by the model yields a pos-
sible explanation for the observed pattern in the data, I run an empirical analysis using
continuous distance measures. The variable of interest is the geographical differentiation
between a store of chain i and a store of chain j, denoted as Diff comp, which is estimated
as a function of demand shifters (X) and distribution aspects from the supply side (Y ).
E [Diff comp|X, Y ]
Recall that the constructed datasets of stores and markets, where at least one store per
market is active, captures thee possible market outcomes in terms of market presence of
the supermarket chains. To verify the model, we are especially interested in firms’ location
choice under competition. To identify stores in competitive markets, I generate dummy
variables depending on the number of stores that each firm operates in the market, in
particular:
Competition = 1 if (NK ≥ 1, NS ≥ 1)
16I abstract from scale effects which might be larger for Kroger as the leading supermarket chain.
17Other reasons may be a pre-emptive behaviour of the firm, that is packing stores close together to
foreclose the market, or agglomeration effects, which are not considered in this analysis.
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Note that when analyzing the differentiation between stores of different chains, I implic-
itly select the competitive markets. However, since the selection rule s is a deterministic
function of the market presence, which is captured in the matrix X as NS and NK re-
spectively, we have E [u|X,S, s] = E [u|X,S] such that the selection issue can be ignored.
So let’s specify the model of geographic differentiation:
E [Diff comp|X, Y ] = β0 + β1X + β2Y
with X = (Pop, SQMI,N own, N comp)′ and Y =
(
DistDC,own, (DistDC,own)2
)′
The underlying intuition of this specification is based on the H&H model presented in
the previous chapter. Note that if the DC costs were not considered in the firm’s location
choice, the differentiation should be independent of Y . I expect that if the distribution
center is not too far away from the market, the stores consider the distribution distance in
their location choice with respect to the competitor. However, when bringing the model
to the data, I face two potential problems which are discussed in the following.
Network problem. The ideal experiment to analyze whether there is a distribution ef-
fect as specified in the model would be taking otherwise equal linear cities with N = 2
stores each and random DC locations in space. However, contrary to the simplified theo-
retical model, in real world there are markets with more than two stores, that is a store
network for which our linear model doesn’t account for. In such markets, a supermarket
has to consider the geographic differentiation to more than one competing store. It seems
reasonable that the closest store, in terms of the Euclidean distance, matters most in the
price competition but considering only the ’closest neighbor’ ignores possible competition
effects of other stores.18
Simultaneity problem. The aim is to explain the store-differentiation as a function of the
location of the closest DC. If I use the distance to the closest DC as explanatory variable,
I may introduce a simultaneity problem. If the distribution distance is endogeneously
determined by the store’s location choice, which is captured in the differentiation of the
firms, the estimated coefficient β2 will be biased.
In a first step, to demonstrate the link between geographic differentiation and distribu-
tion distance, I run an ad-hoc analysis using the closest neighbor distances as endogenous
variable and the store distance to the closest DC as explanatory variable.
In a second step, I address both of the mentioned problems at once using aggregated
data. To address the network-problem, the easiest solution to implement is to redefine
the dependent variable as the average differentiation within a market. This might be
interpreted as a kind of representative differentiation within a market but comes at the
cost of ”loosing” observations when going from store-level data over to market-level data.
For the analysis of the store differentiation to the closest competitor we are left with 67
observations (oligopolistic markets). For the purpose of this analysis I consider this small
sample as still enough to get rid of the network problem at a low cost. A more sophisti-
cated solution, using store-level data, would be to redefine nearness, taking the weighted
average differentiation over an x-miles radius around each store or to set up a structural
model.19 For both solutions we need a detailed geography setup which goes beyond the
18A related problem arises for markets where A is the closest neighbor of B but for B the closest
neighbor is C.
19For a discussion of ”What is near?” see for example Miller(2004).
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purpose of this paper. Hence, I implement the solution with aggregated data and leave
the alternative option for further work. Moreover, the simultaneity problem is addressed
with an IV approach. While the individual store distance to the closest DC may depend
on the differentiation between stores, the distance of the exogenous DC location to the
exogenous market centroid (Dist centroidDC) is supposed not to be correlated with the
error term but is highly correlated with the store distance to the DC as well as the average
supply distance within a market which yields a good instrument. Since I include level as
well as squared distribution distances, I use both, the distance and the squared distance
from the market centroid to the closest DC which are linearly independent instruments.
Figure 8: Regression results
The regression table depicts the main results. Column (1)-(2) present the results of the
ad hoc analysis based on store level data, with the geographic differentiation of Kroger
(Safeway) from competing stores as dependent variable. It’s worth mentioning that I
include the number of stores, treatend as exogenous in the location decision, since more
stores in a small area necessarily cause a smaller store-differentiation. Not controlling for
the number of stores would cause an omitted variable bias in the coefficient of the geo-
graphic area (square miles). Looking at the results, it attracts attention that for Kroger
distribution costs are significant in the location choice while for Safeway they are not.
Although, looking at the summary statistics, the firms seem to follow similar strategies,
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the ad-hoc analysis suggests that only Kroger internalizes the cost effect. Column (1)
suggest a stable U-shaped pattern of the distance to the DC. Together with the negative
coefficient of the level distance and the positive intercept, the quadratic pattern implies
that for ’small’ supply distances the differentiation decreases in the supply distance while
for large distances the differentiation increases. For Kroger, the minimum differentiation
is reached at DistDC,K = 1.2 (120 miles) which is in line with our conjecture about a
kind of distance threshold when interpreting the distribution of the supply-distance in
Figure 7. With respect to the model, the store-level results suggest that Kroger is playing
a hybrid location strategy considering distribution costs in it’s strategic positioning as
outlined in the simple linear model with distribution costs. If the DC is more than 120
miles away, the firm differentiates more and more from it’s competitor since distribution
economies become less important which is in line with the extension of the model when
z2 > 0. Respective other demand shifter that effect the firm’s location choice, the results
are as expected. A larger market area provides more space for differentiation and also the
number of stores for each chain restrictive for the location choice. Moreover an increase
in the population decreases the differentiation between firms but we have to be careful
with the interpretation since we don’t control for the distribution of the consumers inside
the market.
Considering the market-level regressions with instrumented distribution distances, column
(3) and (4), the results confirm the U-shaped pattern for Kroger but also for Safeway the
distribution costs become significant at the aggregated level. For Safeway, it seems to
be especially the network effect which drives the relationship between differentiation and
distribution distance. However, to clarify the Safeway-pattern and to draw further im-
plications beyond the qualitative results presented in this paper, we refer to our current
work in a separate paper which uses a discrete model (contrary to the continuous model
presented in this paper) to accomodate the complex decision process of the firms in a
structural model.
To summarize, the data suggest that for close distribution centers, the differentiation
decreases in the distribution distance while for sufficiently far distribution centers, the
differentiation between firms increases which can be justified by our extension of the
Hotelling model introducing distribution costs. The significant distribution effect is also
consistent with the empirical results by Matsa(2009) who shows that product availability
in terms of low stock-out rates, which are decreasing in the distance to suppliers, are
important to maintain competitiveness.
4 Discussion: Alternative applications of the model
In this paper I refer to differentiation as the geographic distance between firms, but the
presented mechanism can be transfered to further problems of product differentiation, in
particular the decision of product design. Let us redefine the middle of the line segment
as a basic product which can be produced with the common knowledge within the in-
dustry. Assume that any further development of the product characteristics (tailoring to
a specific consumer group) requires specific knowledge which comes at a fixed cost that
is increasing in specialization. In this context, the ’DC-location’ is the generic product
and the ’distribution distance’ the development costs of more specialized products. The
implication of a hybrid location strategy is that the specialization cost can lead start-up
firms to choose more generic products compared to the case where specialization costs
remain unconsidered in the product decision. Alternatively, we may think of two firms
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being endowed ex-ante with a particular technology (incumbent product) and have to
decide whether to develop it further in order to optimize their location in the product
space.
Some particular examples may be found in the software or automobile industry, both in-
dustries with labour-intensive and complex development processes that require specialized
skills. For instance, for software vendors, it may be more efficient to sell relative generic
software packages at competitive prices rather than more specialized software solutions
that imply high development costs. In the automobile industry, we may thing of a par-
ticular car model of each manufacturer and their decision about the new generation of
the cars, that is how far away the engineers move from the characteristics of the original
model. In other words, if the fixed R&D costs are internalized in the product design deci-
sion, the cost consideration can change the optimal location in the product space relative
to a pure demand-based decision.
5 Conclusion
It has been provided a theoretical model and empirical evidence how the consideration of
operational efficiency, in terms of supply costs, in the firms’ optimal location choice affects
the degree of product differentiation among firms. The proposed model has shown that
internalizing the firms’ distribution costs in an otherwise standard Hotelling framework,
maximal horizontal differentiation of competing stores might no longer be optimal. Un-
der weak conditions on the displacement parameters the trade-off between demand and
cost considerations in the firms’ hybrid location choice induces an optimal location in the
interior of the market. Although firms earn less marginal revenues due to the increased
price competition, in terms of net profits they are better off then ignoring distribution
economies and treating supply costs as exogenous once they are established. But also con-
sumers benefit from the hybrid location strategy of the firms since they face lower prices
and spend an aggregate amount of transportation costs which is less (or equal) than in
the standard model. The empirical verification of the model for optimal supermarket lo-
cations suggests that supermarket chains consider distribution distances in their location
choice. The optimal degree of geographic differentiation to the competitor depending on
the distance to the closest distribution center is U-shaped, declining for small or moder-
ate distribution distances and increasing for long distances. The result is in line with the
theoretical model suggesting that a hybrid location strategy is profit-maximizing.
Theory and empirics suggest that the trade-off between competition effect and distribu-
tion economies is the strongest when the distribution facility is relatively close to the
market where the stores are operating. If the distribution center is too far away the dis-
tribution economies decrease and the competition effect dominates the degree of product
differentiation.
This paper is a first step for a better understanding of firms’ optimal location choice in
distribution intensive industries and provides incentives for further empirical research on
the identification of location strategies.
.
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A Proofs and Algebraic Details
Symmetric solution of location choice. We can either see it directly from the best
response function or solve for it analytically if we subtract BR1a − BR1b and solve the
quadratic equation under the feasibility constraint:
(a2 − b2) ∗ (−2
9
t
)
+ (a− b) (−1
3
t− 1
9
tr − 2d1
) ≤ 2d1 (r − zb1 − za1)
Define γ ≡ t
d
and z¯ =
za1+z
b
1
2
, then
a(b) ={
b if za1 = r − zb1
(⇔ z¯1 = 12) ,
−1− 9/(2γ) +√[b+ 1 + 9/(2γ)]2 + (9/γ)(2z¯1 − r) otherwise
In this paper I focus on the symmetric location equilibrium but I may conjecture that
whenever the symmetry condition za = r − zb doesn’t hold, there exists an asymmetric
location equilibrium iff the cost advantage of the market leader is not too strong.
General DC location. Under symmetry, the optimal location is implicitly given by
F = a
(−2
3
t− 2d1
)
+ d2 · 1√
1+
(
z2
z1−a
)2 − 16tr + 2d1z1 ≤ 0. Since F (a = −∞) = −∞ and
F (a = +∞) = +∞ and F is continuous in a, there is at least one root. And since all the
summands of F are monotonic on the interval [0, r] or a constant, the root is also unique.
To check whether there is an interior solution on the Hotelling Line it is enough to check
for a positive root which is the case whenever F (0) > 0. Evaluating F at zero yields the
following condition for an interior solution: d2z2√
z1+z2
+ 2d1z1 ≤ 16tr.
Proof Proposition 1. The firm’s best location is an interior solution on the Hotelling
Line if the consumers’ travel cost parameter is small enough (relative to the distribution
cost parameter) such that t < tcrit(b) =
[
2d1z
a
1 +
d2za1√
(za1 )
2+(za2 )
2
] [− 1
18
b2 +
(
1
6
− 1
18
r
)
b+ 1
6
r
]−1
.
Under symmetry, the condition collapses to t < tcrit =
1
r
(
12d1z
a
1 +
6d2za1√
(za1 )
2+(za2 )
2
)
.
Since for z1 > a the MRDE(a) are strictly increasing in a and MRPD(a) are strictly
decreasing in a, if MRDE(a = 0) > MRPD(a = 0) the firm chooses a corner solution,
a = 0. From the equilibrium condition (1) it can be seen that this is the case whenever(
1
18
t
)
b2 +
(
1
18
tr − 1
6
t
)
b− 1
6
tr < −2d1z1 − d2z1√
z21+z
2
2
and under rearrangement we can estab-
lish a critical value tcrit(b; z, t, d). If t > tcrit, the demand effect dominates the supply
effect and the firm finds it optimal to choose maximal differentiation. Note that if z2 = 0,
d2 = 0 or d1 = d2, I could define a relative threshold (t/d1)crit.. Under symmetry a = b,
the threshold reduces to tcrit =
1
r
(
12d1z1 +
6d2z1√
z21+z
2
2
)
.
Proof of Preposition 2. First, recall that the effect of the market distance from the
exogenous DC location is linear separable from the market events, that is the hypothet-
ical case that agents as well as DC(s) are located inside the market. Hence, I take the
derivative of the scale-effect with respect to the distance between market and DC location
(z2) :
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∂2DCa
∂a∂za2
=
d2(za1−a)za2
[(za1−a)2+(za2 )2]
2
3
≥ 0 for za1 ≥ a
Since the MRDE are negative for any za1 > a (indicating marginal cost savings), the
positive sign of the second derivative implies diminishing distribution economies as the
distance of the DC to the market becomes large.
B Detailed explanation of the data
Kroger. To identify supermarkets which are operated by The Kroger Company, I use a
free POI file from July 2012 identifying the geographic coordinates and banners for all
grocery stores which are under the firm’s ownership (www.poi-factory.com). Additional
information from the firm’s web site allows to identify the store format which is operated
under each banner. (www.thekrogerco.com). The GPS data provide a total number of
2.428 grocery retail stores in the U.S. of which 2.110 are supermarkets, 146 are warehouse
stores and 172 are multi-department stores (similar to supercenters). The data are con-
sistent with the firm’s public information indicating in may 2012 a total number of 2.425
grocery retail stores, that is 3 stores less than the data which I assign to the two month
difference between this data sources. (The data consistency holds also for the firm’s con-
venience stores, which differ in only 3 stores with 786 stores registered in the POI dataset
and 789 stores indicated by the firm in may 2012.) The locations of the distribution
facilities are collected from the firm’s ’Ship-to Warehouse Location List’ for vendors who
are required to use EDI (Electronic Data Interchange). In 2012 the warehouse location
list indicates 34 distribution divisions of which 27 are local distribution divisions and
7 are supraregional consolidation warehouses, denominated ’Peyton’s DC’ and ’Goddard
Western DC’. While some divisions have only one big local distribution center others have
several specialized warehouses located next to each other, in the latter case I took the
street address of the most general one for the geocodification. The information is con-
sistent with other firm sources like the ’2011 Fact Book’, which indicates 34 distribution
centers. It is worth mentioning that some DCs are operated by the firm itself while others
are operated by third party service providers, which is as a result of Kroger’s outsourc-
ing and remodeling of its distribution network during the last years. When analyzing
the subsample of the supermarket format only, I exclude the FredMeyer Regional DC (di-
vision 22) which supplies the multi-department stores that are operated under this banner.
Safeway. To identify stores and DCs of Safeway I use two types of sources. First, I
use a POI dataset which identifies all Safeway facilities in the U.S. and Canada based on
firm information. The data set provides locations for all stores of any brand as well as
associated distribution centers which were operated in March 2008. After sorting out the
number of retail stores in the US we are left with 1.545 store locations in the U.S., of which
973 are operated under the Safeway banner, 300 Vons, 116 Randalls, 80 Dominick’s, 37
Genuardi’s and 39 Carrs (I eliminate one observation ’Citrine Bistro’). A comparison with
data from the ’SW Fact Book 2008’ and the ’2007 Annual Report’, show an acceptable
difference of 24 stores. The US stores are assigned to 9 Operation Areas (Divisions) which
are supplied by 13 main distribution centers. In general each division has one regional DC,
exceptions are South California (Vons) and Texas (Randalls) which have two DCs each
and Seattle which is supplied by even three different DCs. Complementary information
from the firm’s web site allows to match each store with the corresponding distribution
center by the division.
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Market definition. Markets for ’neighborhood grocery stores’ are defined as urbanized
areas (UAs). We have shown that this particular definition is convenient for the Kroger-
Safeway-data. To illustrate where this markets are located, the map below indicates all
the UAs where at least one of the firms is present.
Considered markets (UAs) in the US with active Kroger-stores and/or Safeway-stores
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